Key security: AWS Nitro Enclaves
Private key material never exists in plaintext outside of a hardware-isolated execution environment. OMS wallets use AWS Nitro Enclaves, a hardware-enforced isolation model where:- The enclave runs in a separate memory space, invisible to the host OS.
- No SSH access, no persistent storage, no network interface (except a controlled virtual socket).
- Code running in the enclave is verified against a known measurement (EIF hash) before it can decrypt key material.
- OMS wallet operators cannot access user keys, even with root access to the host machine.
Enclave-bound authentication
Authentication runs inside the Nitro Enclave. The enclave verifies user identity through OAuth + PKCE, OIDC, or email OTP, then binds the verified identity to a device credential keypair held by the client SDK. Every RPC is signed with that credential before it leaves the client; no OAuth secret is handled by app-layer code. The app never receives the raw OAuth token. The enclave processes it and returns only a signed attestation scoped to the app domain. Even a fully compromised app server cannot extract user credentials or reuse an attestation outside its intended scope. For the full authentication flow, credential-signing protocol, and key derivation details, see Wallets Infrastructure.Merkleized wallet configuration
The wallet’s onchain state is a single Merkle root: a compact commitment to the full configuration including:- Authorized signers (session keys, recovery keys)
- Smart session rules (explicit permissions)
- Recovery configuration
Guard Firewall
The Guard Firewall is an optional transaction review layer that runs before any transaction reaches the chain. It can be configured to:- Block transactions to non-allowlisted contract addresses.
- Flag transfers exceeding configurable thresholds for review.
- Reject transactions that violate explicit session rules before they reach the relayer.
Non-custodial guarantee
Neither OMS nor Polygon can unilaterally move user funds. The key security properties that enforce this:- User keys are sharded using Shamir’s Secret Sharing across multiple geographically distributed remote key holders. No single entity, including the operator, holds a complete key.
- The signing enclave requires a valid attestation from the in-enclave authentication service to decrypt and use any key shard.
- Attestations are scoped to a specific app domain and expire. A compromised attestation cannot be reused by a different app or after expiry.